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This introduction to the special issue considers how independent research on 
mis/disinformation campaigns can be conducted in a corporate environment hostile to 
academic research. We provide an overview of the disinformation landscape in the 
wake of the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica data scandal and social platforms’ 
decision to enforce access lockdowns and the throttling of Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs) for data collection. We argue that the governance shift from user 
communities to social media algorithms, along with social platforms’ intensive 
emphasis on generating revenue from user data, has eroded the mutual trust of 
 
 
networked publics and opened the way for dis/misinformation campaigns. We discuss 
the importance of open, public APIs for academic research as well as the unique 
challenges of collecting social media data to study highly ephemeral 
mis/disinformation campaigns. The introduction concludes with an assessment of the 
growing data access gap that not only hinders research of public interest, but that may 
also preclude researchers from identifying meaningful research questions as activity 
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This Special Issue addresses the question of how researchers can conduct independent, 
ethical research on dis/misinformation operations in a rapidly changing and hostile data 
environment. The escalating issue of data access we discuss is thrown into sharp relief by the 
strategic use of bots, trolls, fake news, strategies of false amplification, and a corporate 
environment favoring platform lockdowns and the restriction of access to Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs). As social media platforms increase obstacles to independent 
scholarship by dramatically curbing access to APIs, researchers are faced with the stark 
choice of either limiting their use of trace data or developing new methods of data collection. 
Without a breakthrough, social media research may go the way of search engine research, in 
which only a small group of researchers who have direct relationships with search companies 
such as Google and Microsoft can access data and conduct research. 
 
The reflections that follow highlight the current scholarly predicament of grappling with the 
time-sensitive nature of strategic and disruptive communication in highly ephemeral 
dis/misinformation campaigns. These campaigns unfold in increasingly polarized, hybrid 
media environments where news stories are written, disseminated, and interpreted within and 
across intricate digital networks. While researchers are developing more sophisticated multi-
method research designs and rich multi-source data sets (Chadwick, Vaccari, & O’Loughlin, 
2018; Möller, Trilling, Helberger, & van Es, 2018), this methodological progress is 
threatened by the active resistance of social media platforms to providing support for research 
on topics that require greater transparency and may negatively impact their bottom line 
(Dance, LaForgia, & Confessore, 2018). 
 
The Disinformation Landscape 
The set of articles presented in this issue take stock of the epochal changes triggered by the 
deployment of data-driven micro-targeting in political campaigns epitomized by the 
Cambridge Analytica data scandal and the ensuing data lockdown enforced by social media 
platforms. Digital trace data has been increasingly linked to disinformation, misinformation, 
and state propaganda across Western industrialized democracies and countries in the Global 
South, where state and non-state actors seek to strategically diffuse content that heightens 
partisanship and erodes the general trust in democratic institutions. 
 
Influence operations weaponizing social media have been identified in elections worldwide, 
with prominent examples including the 2016 US elections and the 2017 general elections in 
 
 
France (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Ferrara, 2017; Weedon, Nuland, & Stamos, 2017). This 
evolving disinformation landscape required the increasing adoption of specialized vocabulary 
associated with influence and disruptive operations to describe a set of media practices 
designed to exploit deep-seated tensions in liberal democracies (Bennett & Steven, 2018). 
The tactics documented are part of a concerted strategy to polarize voters and alienate them 
from the electoral process (Benkler, Farris, & Roberts, 2018). This scheme—infamously 
associated with Russian troll factories—took the form of misinformation, or information 
identified as inaccurate (Karlova & Fisher, 2013), and disinformation, or the intentional 
distribution of fabricated stories to advance political goals (Bennett & Steven, 2018). 
 
Misinformation and disinformation pose a serious threat to objective decision-making by the 
voting public (Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017, p. 354). The effectiveness of 
dis/misinformation campaigns has in part (Benkler, Farris, et al., 2018) been attributed to the 
manner in which they have been able to take advantage of the biases (Comor, 2001; Innis, 
1982) intrinsic to social media platforms, particularly the attention economy and the social 
media supply chain that relies on viral content (Jenkins, Ford, Green, & New, 2013) for 
revenue generation. In their response, social media platforms attempted to rekindle trust by 
appearing to reinforce individual privacy within a newly secured user community, a set of 
measures that also locked academic and non-profit researchers out from studying social 
platforms while preserving corporate and business access to social media users’ data. 
 
Infrastructural Transformation of the Networked Publics 
This backdrop of influence operations and information warfare presents a considerable 
departure from years of euphoric rhetoric praising the democratization of public discourse 
brought by networking technology and social media platforms (Howard & Hussain, 2013). 
Early scholarship extolling the potential of social media for democratization and deliberation 
inadvertently reinforced a narrative championing communication and collaboration as 
expected affordances of social platforms (Loader & Mercea, 2011). By the end of the decade, 
however, the narrative surrounding social platforms increasingly turned to metaphors 
foregrounding polarization and division in a landscape marked by tribalism and information 
warfare (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018), enabled by a business model driven above all by 
the commodification of digital circulation and its capitalization on financial markets (Langley 
& Leyshon, 2017). 
 
Scholarship on this hybrid media ecosystem (Chadwick, 2017) explored the technological 
affordances and ideological leanings that shape social media interaction, with a topical 
interest in the potential for civic engagement and democratic revitalization (Zuckerman, 
2014). Bennett and Segerberg (2013) expanded on Olson’s seminal work on the logic of 
collective action to explain the rise of digital networked politics where individuals would 
come together to address common problems. Similarly, Castells (2009) described a global 
media ecology of self-publication and scalable mobilization that advanced internet use and 
political participation (Castells, 2012).  
 
Open platforms and unrestricted access offered the cornerstone of networked publics that 
reconfigured sociality and public life (Boyd, 2008). The relatively open infrastructure of 
networked publics was also explored in scholarship detailing how online social networks 
support gatewatching (Bruns, 2005) and practices in citizen journalism that are central to a 
diverse media ecosystem (Hermida, 2010), with citizens auditing the gatekeeping power of 
mainstream media and holding elite interests to account (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). By most 
assessments, social network sites were welcoming challengers to the monopoly enjoyed by 
 
 
the mass media (Castells, 2012), with only limited attention devoted to the opportunities 
offered to propagandists that could similarly coordinate and organize disinformation 
campaigns through decentralized and distributed networks (Benkler, Faris, et al., 2018). 
 
These developments challenged the very idea of networked publics and Castells’ (2012) 
depiction of the internet as universal commons. However, the transition from narratives 
emphasizing open communication to concerns about information warfare was neither 
immediate nor trivial. With mobile platforms slowly replacing desktop-based applications, 
open standards gave way to centralized communication systems epitomized by social media 
platforms, social technologies pivoted from a business model centered on software and 
services to the selling and reselling of user data. These changes endangered the openness of 
networked publics, with the debate underpinning networks in the late 90s being replaced by a 
focus on the affordances of mobile apps and social platforms, whose user base largely differs 
from living communities of users that would come together around common interests. 
 
Also noticeable in the transition from networked publics to social platforms was the increased 
commercialization of previously public, open, and often collaborative spaces that were 
increasingly reduced to private property. This infrastructural transformation of the networked 
publics continues to drive anxieties about social media platforms in the aftermath of the 
Cambridge Analytica data scandal, including topical issues of digital privacy, data access, 
surveillance, microtargeting, and the growing influence of algorithms in society. 
Counterbalancing reactions to these developments, distributed networks services have started 
in the Fediverse such as Mastodon or Pleroma. However, on the most prevalent social media 
platforms, the existing networked publics are defined by the technological and market 
exigencies of the corporations who own them. 
 
Algorithmization of Online Communities 
Social platforms built much of their social infrastructure on the back of networked publics 
and the community organization that shaped internet services in the early 90s. The drive 
towards community formation remains an important component of social media platforms, 
notwithstanding the growing trend towards data access restrictions and end-to-end encryption 
of their services. Indeed, on 27 February 2017, at a time when investigations into disruptive 
communication in the previous year’s US elections were still in their infancy, the CEO of 
Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, wrote in a note published on his Facebook page titled “Building 
Global Community:” 
 
“History is the story of how we’ve learned to come together in ever greater 
numbers—from tribes to cities to nations. At each step, we built social infrastructure 
like communities, media, and governments to empower us to achieve things we 
couldn’t on our own… Today we are close to taking our next step. Our greatest 
opportunities are now global… Progress now requires humanity coming together not 
just as cities or nations, but also as a global community.” (Zuckerberg, 2017, emphasis 
added) 
 
Zuckerberg’s vision simultaneously highlighted and projected the end of open networked 
publics. With increasing government pressure before the end of that same year, Zuckerberg 
would yield and testify before the US Congress in an investigation on Russian interference in 
the 2016 elections; the company would see its share price plunge amid revelations that 
commercial third-parties and foreign arms-length agencies were able to harness Facebook to 
micro-target voters (Neate, 2018). In the attempt to reverse its fortunes, Facebook launched 
 
 
multiple measures, including restricting third-party access to its Pages Application 
Programming Interface (API) that provided access to posts, comments, and metadata 
associated with communication on public Facebook pages (Schroepfer, 2018). 
 
The immediate implications of this step for the—already remarkably limited—ability of 
independent academic researchers to form a systematic understanding of social interaction on 
private social media platforms (Driscoll & Walker, 2014; Skeggs & Yuill, 2015) were soon 
highlighted in an open letter by scholars (Bruns et al., 2018). However, at a deeper and more 
abstract level, one can unpick the discourse of Zuckerberg’s manifesto to discern why his 
appropriation of the trope and exhortation of the value of community exposed, inadvertently, 
both the ills that plagued his platform and the steps to redress them, which were lamented as 
foreclosing democratic accountability (Bruns et al., 2018). 
 
Social media platforms cannot be separated from the user communities that populate them. 
The business model of social platforms extracts data from community interactions (i.e. 
transactions among members) that can be monetized (Dijck, 2013; Fernback, 2007, p. 64) by 
a lucrative advertising business. The latter governs group interaction and individual 
experience alike through a set of intricate learning algorithms (Bucher, 2017). These 
algorithms rely on users as “affective processors” who interpret and help govern the 
communities through shares, likes, retweets, and pins (Gehl, 2011; Lomborg & Kapsch, 
2019). However opaque to users, algorithms generate knowledge about users beyond their 
immediate interactions, thereby triggering further interactions and “imaginaries of 
interaction,” i.e., user theories about what the algorithm is and ought to be (Bucher, 2017). 
 
The algorithmization of communities championed by social platforms was a milestone that 
instantaneously rendered networked publics into a profitable source of users’ interactions. 
Transferring community governance from users to algorithms removed a key basis for mutual 
trust, opening the way for large-scale disinformation campaigns that conspicuously plagued 
election cycles, ethnic relations, and civic mobilization from 2016 onwards (Apuzzo & 
Santariano, 2019). By Facebook’s own account (Weedon et al., 2017), its advertising 
algorithms were harnessed to segment users into belief communities that could be micro-
targeted with materials that amplified their intimate political preferences. This repurposing of 
intimate knowledge and networked interaction for revenue-making remained the corollary of 
commercial social media enterprises, including the individuals and academics involved in the 
notorious and now defunct political consultancy firm Cambridge Analytica (Rosenberg, 
2018).  
 
The operations executed by Cambridge Analytica may have violated Facebook’s terms of 
service (Rosenberg, 2018), but they were broadly similar to Facebook’s business model that 
extracts commercial value from users’ data. As such, they did not go against the grain of the 
platform’s business model. On the contrary, the consultancy cynically maximized Facebook’s 
political utility by monetizing social-psychological user traits and using granular trace data to 
micro-target political advertisements on the platform (House of Commons Digital, 2019). In 
an attempt to reassert the integrity of the user community, Facebook rolled out in 2018 a 
tighter data management regime that, in some assessments, equally protects users’ privacy 
and safeguards the company’s advertising business by closely guarding user data for its own 
corporate use only (Tufekci, 2019). 
 
Facebook’s community governance will likely continue to be contested, not least because of 
what it represents: a corporate hegemony that is far removed from networked publics which 
 
 
used to provide a counterweight to state and corporate power over individuals. Policymakers, 
in democratic countries, have demanded with some success more accountability from social 
platforms in respect to their efforts to arrest disruptive communication and preserve the 
intimacy of users, with the German legislation being portrayed as an exemplar 
(Bundeskartellamt, 2019; Volpicelli, 2019). Academics, on the other hand, have mostly been 
unsuccessful in their appeal to social platforms to open themselves up to a level of public 
scrutiny that permits investigations of its user communities by scholars. In response to 
Facebook’s public API throttling, several prominent academic researchers stressed the 
following: 
 
“Platform providers — and the research advisors they collaborate with — cannot be 
allowed to position themselves as the gatekeepers for the research that investigates 
how their platforms are used. Instead, we need far more transparent data access 
models that clearly articulate to platform users who may be accessing their data, and 
for what purposes.” (Bruns et al., 2018) 
 
Why Public APIs Matter 
Studies in this Special Issue add to a growing body of purposeful attempts to generate 
meaningful, valid, and reliable results with proprietary data to which access is limited, 
selective, and often opaque (Driscoll & Walker, 2014). This introduction and Bruns’ article, 
specifically, spotlight the corporate response of social media platforms—the most stringent of 
which has been that of Facebook, which drastically restricted access to its public APIs—to 
justified alarm regarding the use of personal trace data in disruptive communication (House 
of Commons Digital, 2019).  
 
Public and open APIs allow researchers to retrieve large-scale data and curate databases 
associated with sociologically meaningful events. Without them, web interfaces have to be 
scraped to access the data (Freelon, 2018), which is labor-intensive and drastically limits the 
amount of information that can be collected and processed. Locking researchers out of the 
APIs constrains them to human-intensive means of data collection that cannot produce large 
or representative samples of real-world events, such as social movements, elections, let alone 
state and non-state sponsored disinformation campaigns. 
 
Illustratively, Twitter operates three well-documented, public APIs (Twitter, 2019) in 
addition to its premium and enterprise offerings. Twitter’s relative accessibility leads it to 
being vastly over-represented in social media research (Blank, 2016). Public and open APIs 
such as that of Twitter are an exception in the social media ecosystem. By contrast, 
Facebook’s Public Feed API (Facebook, 2019) is restricted to a limited set of media 
publishers. It is against this backdrop that researchers have suggested that restrictions on data 
access may lead to the consideration of alternative methods (Venturini & Rogers, 2019); and, 
in the “post API Age”, the increased use of data collection methods that may run counter to 
platform terms of service such as web scraping (Freelon, 2018). 
 
These suggestions offer a roadmap to resources researchers may leverage to implement their 
studies, but they underestimate the central role of APIs in providing scalable and reproducible 
access to data. This line of thought is epitomized in references to a “post API Age” (Freelon, 
2018) asserting that APIs are in the process of being retired. It would be more accurate to 
refer to a “post-public-API age,” as Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) remain a 
central component of mobile and cloud-based technologies that are central to the 
infrastructure of social media platforms. Indeed, it is difficult to see how cloud-based 
 
 
business development, and web applications in general, could perform operations requiring 
personalization and scalability without resorting to APIs. 
 
Perhaps more importantly, these APIs and alternative methods of data collection are not drop-
in replacements. The volume, type (text, image, videos, interface, etc.), fidelity, timeliness, 
platform filtering, and amount of metadata vary considerably across these methods. High-
volume data retrieved from APIs cannot directly replace low-volume web scraping data. 
Even if the volume of data collected using web scraping or APIs were identical, the metadata 
available via API requests is considerably different from metadata that is visible on the user-
facing portions of a social media platform’s website used for web scraping. 
 
Social platform restrictions to public API access are only one aspect of the multi-faceted 
challenge involved in collecting digital trace data. Data access is the first in a number of steps 
researchers have to take as they collect, process, validate, interpret, share, and archive the 
data. These steps often require robust technical skills, as API endpoints for data collection 
were designed for programmers building application software that adds to the services 
offered by social platforms. As such, APIs were envisioned for purposes that differ from 
reproducible scientific research, a problem compounded by the significant differences 
between data retrieved from APIs and data visible to users on the websites and mobile apps 
of social platforms (Venturini & Rogers, 2019). 
 
Locked, Instable, and Ephemeral 
Asymmetries between information retrieved from APIs and that to which users have accessed 
on the web are due to social media sites being simultaneously a platform and an infrastructure 
(Plantin, Lagoze, Edwards, & Sandvig, 2016). Their underlying features and structures offer 
a rigid set of affordances, or entry points, constraining the ability to access, query, format, 
and collect data. These entry points take two forms: (1) interfaces for human-consumption 
(e.g. Facebook.com, Twitter.com, and mobile applications) and (2) software interfaces 
designed for consumption by computer programs called Application Programming Interfaces, 
with prominent examples including the Facebook Graph API, Twitter Streaming API, and 
Instagram API (Helmond, 2015). Social media sites have offered these website interfaces on 
the open web to extend their reach, decentralize data production, and centralize data 
collection and processing (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013). 
 
The underlying features of social platforms impinge on research designs and data collection, 
as one cannot ask questions of data that is not possible to collect. While data access is a 
perennial problem in social science research, a topic extensively examined in relation to 
survey response and privileged access to interviews (Babbie, 2015; Biernacki & Waldorf, 
1981; Weller & Kinder-Kurlanda, 2016), the implications of observing dynamic content at a 
particular or arbitrary point in time and issues of preservation of social media data are the 
object of limited attention and rarely discussed in research publications. Social media posts 
and their accompanying metadata are fundamentally ephemeral, a term largely used as a 
shorthand for instability: data is constantly changing, being updated, or deleted. 
 
The everchanging nature of social media data make it difficult for any given two researchers 
to collect the same exact dataset in real-time. It also makes it virtually impossible for 
disparate research teams to collect the same dataset retrospectively via the purchase of data 
from a reseller or by scraping social media websites (Burgess & Bruns, 2015). In addition to 
that, and perhaps more worryingly, researchers are often forbidden from sharing full datasets 
by the terms of service of many platforms. While some platforms, such as Twitter, allow for 
 
 
the sharing of each post’s unique identification number, this still requires researchers to 
programmatically “rehydrate” social media posts, if still accessible. While this solves the 
issue of informing other researchers which posts were included in the study, and also 
provides a method for comparing posts in different datasets, it creates at least three major 
issues across many social media platforms. 
 
First, deleted posts and posts from deleted accounts cannot be retrieved from the API thereby 
generating orphaned data. Researchers studying misinformation are particularly interested in 
posts that have been deleted by users or platforms (Bastos & Mercea, 2019). Second, 
modified posts and modified post metadata are not flagged by APIs or web interfaces, so 
researchers cannot determine if a post or its metadata was changed, updated, or corrected 
since it was posted. Third, large datasets are difficult and time-consuming to rehydrate due to 
API request limits. The Twitter REST API is currently rate-limited to 150 requests per hour, 
returning a maximum of 100 tweets per request. While it is possible to get around these 
limitations by using multiple accounts simultaneously, doing so increases the technical 
complexity of the rehydration process.  
 
The post IDs themselves fall under the definition advanced by Gray, Szalay, Thakar, and 
Stoughton (2002) of ephemeral data, since in most instances once collected these datasets 
cannot be reconstructed. When a post changes or disappears, it may end up being a research 
opportunity lost forever (Lynch, 2008) or present a false account of the phenomena under 
study. In the end, such obstacles to collecting and sharing datasets make it difficult and often 
impossible for researchers to validate or replicate studies using social media data (Felt, 2016). 
It additionally prevents researchers from repurposing previously collected data or expanding 
on research using the same dataset. 
 
Overcoming the Data Access Gap  
Perennial issues of research replication have been compounded by social platforms’ API 
throttling, simultaneously reducing their public accountability and increasing their 
opaqueness (Bastos & Mercea, 2018). Shortly after the decision to drastically limit API 
access, Facebook sought to counter researchers’ concerns by vowing (Schrage & Ginsberg, 
2018) to help the academic community gain access to social media data of public interest, 
starting with elections. In partnership with leading academics, public bodies, and established 
funding organizations, Facebook sought to collaborate with a centralized data management 
scheme overseen by Social Science One, an initiative that would invite and filter applications 
for access to datasets (for details, see commentaries of Bruns and Puschmann in this issue). 
 
The predicament in which academics now seeking data access find themselves is evocative of 
the longer-standing transformation of the mission of public universities (Gumport, 1997; 
Walton, 2011). The erstwhile conception of universities as self-governed entities committed 
to the formulation, testing, and dissemination of scientific knowledge is undermined by their 
dependence on private enterprise and corporate activity that control data access and, to a 
growing extent, use. As the foundation for not only productive innovation but also new 
regulation, scientific knowledge could act as a restraint on corporate control (Gauchat, 2012, 
p. 183). However, its ability to perform this role is restricted, inter alia, by the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights on various aspects of research including, as described above, 
inputs such as data and outputs such as publications. More immediately, the creation of 
Social Science One as a gatekeeping body governing the relationship between Facebook and 
academics exemplifies a governance model that may widen the gap between data-rich 
 
 
industry researchers with connections to social platforms and independent researchers 
working outside corporations. 
 
This divide has been characterized as the gap between “big data rich researchers,” who have 
access to proprietary data and might be working in the interests of the company employing 
them, and the “big data poor”, or the broad universe of academic researchers whose findings 
may be of public interest but may ultimately be critical of social media platforms (Boyd & 
Crawford, 2012). The data access gap not only hinders research that is peripheral to 
commercial interests, but it may also preclude researchers from identifying sociologically 
meaningful research questions because activity on social media is becoming increasingly 
more inscrutable and unobservable. 
 
Alongside this apparent erosion of academic self-governance (Walton, 2011), researchers 
have to contend with the likelihood that social media users may not be readily open to the 
idea that their public communication become the object of scientific research (Fiesler & 
Proferes, 2018). Research entailing the automatic collection of large datasets covering long 
periods of time must meet expectations of non-exploitation and minimum risk/maximum 
benefit to informed and consenting users. To reduce the chances of causing harm to users, 
researchers need to find ways to obscure the presence or remove traces of any identifiable 
user from the data such that users are not unwillingly identified as members of an unintended 
community (e.g. of political dissidents).  
 
Halavais’ article (this issue) addresses some of these issues by proposing a framework of 
ethical distributed research involving the pragmatic partnership between users and 
researchers, thereby bypassing platform owners. The article suggests ways this could be 
accomplished and argues that the balance of power between the social media industry on one 
side and the users and researchers on the other has become dangerously skewed. Another 
innovative method to study mis/disinformation is presented by Acker and Donavan (this 
issue), who show how data craft through metadata manipulation and keyword squatting play 
a prominent role in attracting audiences. The proposed method explores data archives of 
disinformation offered by social media platforms and shows that such sanctioned archives 
prevent researchers from examining organic contexts of manipulation. 
 
The remainder of the articles in this Special Issue tackle issues surrounding data access and 
ethical dilemmas in studying mis/disinformation or offer a roadmap to studying the 
disinformation landscape with limited or fragmented data. Bruns (this issue) outlines the 
societal implications of the “APIcalypse” and reviews potential options available for 
researchers studying hate speech, trolling, and disinformation campaigns. The piece likewise 
offers a critical evaluation of Facebook’s partnership with the Social Science One initiative. 
A response to Bruns’ article is presented by Puschmann (this issue), who argues that current 
models of data access for social media research are also fraught with problems and pose 
significant risks to user privacy. The articles of Bruns and Puschmann offer opposing views 
of the partnerships between academics and industry seeking to address structural issues of 
data access. 
 
Lastly, the Issue includes three case studies of mis/disinformation that successfully overcame 
the data access gap. Xia et al. (this issue) present an in-depth analysis of how the team behind 
an IRA Twitter account crafted the persona “Jenna Abrams” across multiple platforms over 
time and describe the techniques employed to perform personal authenticity and cultural 
competence. Proferes and Summers (this issue) rely on a novel web archiving and scraping 
 
 
approach for data collection to analyze the Wikileaks’ release of John Podesta’s e-mails. The 
article details how the serialized release of batches of e-mails together with the strategic use 
of sequential hashtags allowed Wikileaks to game Twitter trending topics locally, nationally, 
and eventually worldwide. Giglietto et al. (this issue) explore partisan engagement with 
political news through the analysis of Twitter and Facebook interactions in the period leading 
up to the 2018 Italian general election. They show that polarization is not hard-wired even 
into highly partisan networked publics, which may engage strategically with news sources 
covering their favorites.  
 
To conclude, a drive to formulate standards for public-interest research through extensive 
involvement of multiple stakeholders—from corporations to governments, political 
representatives, academic institutions, non-governmental and citizen organizations from the 
Global South (Milan & Treré, 2019) and North—would represent a more durable and 
equitable basis on which to build an alternative data governance regime to the current one. It 
would have to strike a balance between the accountability of all parties, their interests and 
rights while providing effective mechanisms to exercise a check on the power asymmetries 
that led to the sudden closure of the Facebook Pages API. 
 
In that way, the data regime would have to reconcile the universalizing commercial impetus 
that has propelled the expansion of social platforms with the plurality of cultural, political 
and social communities that populate them, through a more democratic power settlement (see 
Laclau, 2001). It is hard to imagine, however, how the current direction of regulation that 
places the onus of privacy protection enforcement in the hands of social platforms (e.g. the 
European General Data Protection Directive, see Puschmann in this issue) may lead to such 
an outcome. Instead, skeptics argue that it will further consolidate their hegemony due to the 
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